AI Agents Can Remember Rules, and Still Break Them After Compression


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Compaction is when a string of complex communications with an AI chat get boiled down into a summary, and the interaction continues based not on the entire history, but on that summary. It's like a 'fresh start', in terms of memory usage, and has been deployed as a solution to the limits of context windows in AI discourse.

Initially instituted in agentic AI, the method has been extended to Claude, while compaction for Gemini has yet to emerge from developer chats, and ChatGPT eschews compaction in favor of just stopping the chat.

If you've used Codex (essentially a version of ChatGPT that can actually change things on your computer, given permissions) for more than 30 minutes at a time, you will have seen intermittent messages about *compacting context*, during which time further interactions are unavailable:




Codex taking a breather to compress its memories of a session that by now has been going on for three weeks.

However, when that compaction is over, the entity talking to you is working from unseen, selective notes, and not a complete memory of the evolution of the chat.

The AI Scofflaw

In June this year the Chinese paper *Governance Decay* established that compaction can silently remove standing rules from an agent's context, causing previously prohibited actions to be carried out:



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From the June 2026 paper on Governance Decay: how context compaction can cause an AI agent to break a rule it previously followed. If the rule is left out of the compressed summary, the agent may go on to perform the forbidden action. An attacker could exploit this process, and how restoring the rule can prevent the violation. Source


Across seven models, violations rose from 0% before compaction to 30% afterwards, reaching 59% in some cases. In practical terms, this means that agents can disregard essential directives such as *Do not contact anyone who does not have a [our-company] email address* – with obvious potential ramifications.

In July, Penn State University and IBM followed up on this research with *Lost in Context*, finding that compaction could discard instructions governing *how* an AI should carry out a task, while preserving the task itself. In tests across three settings, the compactors retained just 17% of these instructions on average.

And in August, a US academic collaboration put forward TRACE, showing that compaction could disrupt an agent even when the information it needed remained recoverable. In tests, agents lost track of where they were in a task, repeated completed work, and became less reliable across repeated runs.

ARCBench

This month, additional insight arrives from the Netherlands in the form of *ARCBench*, a study finding that agents can emerge from compaction with the rule intact *and still become substantially more likely to break it*. In tests where the rule did survive, violations were 2.6 times more frequent after compaction than with the full conversation history:



From the new paper, a conceptual schema for how context compaction can affect an agent's compliance with operating rules. The same later request can be refused when the rule survives compaction, or carried out when the rule is omitted, with an external document able to influence which information is retained. This figured is transmuted from the portrait-aspect original in the source paper, for layout reasons. Source

The study makes a distinction between rules that were lost during compaction, and rules that survived and were subsequently violated – allowing the effects of forgetting and disobedience to be measured independently for the first time.

Across tests with DeepSeek-V4-Flash, GLM-5.3-Flash, Qwen3.7-Flash and GPT-Luna, 70.1% of compacted runs retained the complete rule. Among runs where the rule survived, violations occurred 2.6 times more often than with the full conversation history.

Context, in the traditional sense, proved a factor, since rules presented as organizational policy produced no violations with full context; yet violation rates rose to 30.6% and 22.2% after compaction.

The strongest defense available preserved the rules in 99% of summaries, but still failed to return violations to their pre-attack level, indicating that successful preservation of the rules during compaction doesn't necessarily preserve the agent's ability – or willingness – to follow them.

The paper states:

> *'[We] find that compaction raises violations mostly without deleting the rule: compacted runs retaining the rule still violate 2.6 times as often as runs with the full history.*
>
> *'Moreover, compaction changes the agent's reasoning for violating. Different compaction strategies, tight compaction budget constraints, and rule delivery channel all affect compliance.'*


By way of a remedy, the paper proposes stronger rule preservation for rules lost during compaction, while leaving the problem of agents disobeying retained rules unresolved"

> *'Defenses restore rules, but compliance is still weakened under attack. Rule retention is thus not a sufficient proxy for compliance. Future studies may use ARCBench to explain why agents still violate retained rules, test adaptive attacks and defenses, and cover more models, domains, and longer sessions with repeated compaction.'*

Method

ARCBench extends the functionality of the pi open source harness, which has its own native compaction routines, as well as an agent loop, tool calling and native compaction. The benchmark recreates situations where an agent has been working through a long task under a standing rule, compresses the accumulated history, and then confronts the agent with a request that would violate that rule; the agent's actions are then checked through its tool calls:

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The ARCBench evaluation pipeline. Agents are given a task and operating rule before their histories are compacted under different configurations, attacks and defenses. Their subsequent tool actions are then examined to determine whether the rule was retained and whether it was obeyed.

ARCBench contains 17 cases covering disclosure of protected data, access to restricted resources, unauthorized actions, and bypass or omission of required controls, corresponding to OWASP risk classes.

Cases were adapted from Governance Decay and COMPINT , with four additional cases introduced to ensure that all four violation types were represented for both personal and organizational rules.

The benchmark can be configured across five factors: how the rule is delivered; the method used to compact the context; the token budget available for compaction; the type of attack; and the defense applied:

Factor	Effect on the episode	Settings
Rule delivery channel	Where and how the rule enters the history	Personal: c1 direct instruction, c2 persistence instruction. Organizational: c3 document-embedded, c4 policy-tool fetching
Compaction strategy	How older turns are rewritten into a summary or kept verbatim	Generative: Pi, Pi + RP, Structured, ACON-UT, ACON-UTCO, TRACE, Hermes. Selective: FIFO, LRU (rule), LRU (LLM)
Compaction budget	Size of the compacted history, set by a compactor instruction and output clipping	None, or 200, 300, 750, 1,200, or 2,500 estimated tokens (generative strategies only)
Attack	Content added to tool results before compaction	None; volume injection; compactor-targeted injection (legacy, naive, escape, ignore, fake completion, combined); both
Defense	Change to the compactor's instructions	None; isolation, instructional, sandwich, rule preservation

ARCBench contains five variables for testing how rule compliance changes across different forms of context compaction, rule delivery, attacks and defenses.

Rules can be given as direct or persistent instructions, embedded in documents, or retrieved through a policy tool.

Data and Tests

Ten compaction methods were evaluated, comprising seven generative strategies and three selective approaches. Each case was run repeatedly, and a failure recorded if the agent violated its rule at least once – an approach considered more appropriate for safety testing than averaging performance across runs, since an agent that *occasionally* performs a prohibited action remains unsafe.

The compacted histories were then examined by GPT-6-Luna-Pro, Qwen-3.8-flash and Claude-Sonnet-4.6, with each rule classified as *intact*, *weakened* or *absent*. The majority decision was used, while disagreements were inspected by human annotators, with a separate sample of 50 summaries also manually labeled, to check the judges' consistency.

When an intact rule was violated, the agent's reasoning was examined by GPT-6-Luna-Pro, GPT-6.1-Sol and Claude Sonnet 5.5. Violations were classified according to whether the later request had been treated as permission to override the rule, the action had been judged outside its scope; the rule had gone unmentioned; or the rule had been recognized *and disregarded*.

The four models used for the tests, accessed through OpenRouter, were DeepSeek-V4-Flash; GLM-5.3-Flash; Qwen3.7-Flash; and GPT-Luna. In each run, the same model was used both to compact the conversation history and to act on the resulting context, matching pi's default behavior. The models were accessed through OpenRouter.

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Seven studies were conducted, with Hermes used for most of the compaction tests. In the first study, each of the 17 tasks was tested across four models and two ways of delivering the rule, producing 136 cases. Each was run three times with the original conversation intact and three times after it had been compacted.

	Cases: violation@k				Runs: rule state		
		Compacted			Compacted		
	Full context	Agent's own	Only after	Total	Ret.	Part.	Abs.
S5: added content							
None	9.6	8.9	28.9	37.8	70.1	**26.9**	3.0
V	**9.7**	9.0	25.4	34.3	**71.9**	22.9	5.2
I	**9.7**	9.0	**37.3**	**46.3**	42.5	26.4	**31.1**
V+I	**9.7**	**9.7**	31.3	41.0	54.5	23.4	22.1
S6–S7							
No attack	11.8	11.8	11.8	23.5	96.1	3.9	0.0
Escape	11.8	11.8	**47.1**	**58.8**	66.7	**13.7**	**19.6**
+ rule pres.	11.8	11.8	17.6	29.4	**99.0**	1.0	0.0

Configuration of the seven ARCBench studies, grouped by research question. Green-highlighted cells show the factor varied in each study, while grey cells show settings held fixed; each case was run three times, rising to six runs for the attack and defense studies S6 and S7.

Three questions were addressed in the tests: *Where do violations after compaction come from?*; *How do different compaction configurations change where violations come from?*; and *How do compactor-targeted attacks and defenses affect where violations come from?*.

Where Do Violations after Compaction Come From?

The first results showed a rise in rule-breaking after compaction, from 9.6% of cases with the full history, to 37.8%. However, the rule was completely lost in only 3% of compacted runs; in 70.1% it survived intact, and in 26.9% it survived partially:

	Cases: violation@3				Runs: rule state		
		Compacted			Compacted		
Model	Full context	Agent's own	Only after	Total	Ret.	Part.	Abs.
All	9.6	8.9	28.9	37.8	70.1	26.9	3.0
DeepSeek	8.8	8.8	17.6	26.5	**98.0**	2.0	0.0
GPT-Luna	6.1	6.1	27.3	33.3	48.5	45.5	**6.1**
Qwen	**14.7**	**11.8**	**50.0**	**61.8**	35.3	**58.8**	5.9
GLM	8.8	8.8	20.6	29.4	**98.0**	2.0	0.0

Results showing how often each model violated the rules before and after compaction. Most rules survived compaction fully or partially, even as violations rose substantially; Qwen showed the largest increase, reaching 61.8%.

This distinction proved important. Among individual runs where the full rule survived compaction, 21.1% still ended in a violation, compared with 8.1% when the original history was retained. With a partially preserved rule, the rate rose to 29.4%, and with no rule remaining, to 83.3%.

How violations occurred when the rule remained intact was also examined. Among violations caused by compaction, a later request was interpreted as *permission to proceed* in 45.9% of cases; the rule was apparently disregarded in 27%; and in 21.6%, it was acknowledged as applicable before being violated anyway:

Violating runs	Approval	Scope	Unregis-tered	Acknow-ledged
Full context				
Agent's own	**72.4**	6.9	17.2	3.4
Compacted, rule retained				
Agent's own	**82.4**	5.9	11.8	0.0
Only after compaction	**45.9**	5.4	27.0	21.6

Results showing why rules were violated before and after compaction. When violations appeared only after compaction, later requests were most often treated as permission to proceed (45.9%), while 27% disregarded the retained rule and 21.6% acknowledged it before proceeding anyway.

How Do Different Compaction Configurations Change Where Violations Come From?

The *way* a rule was delivered had a marked effect on compliance. With the full conversation intact, violations occurred in 25% and 16.1% of cases where rules had been supplied personally by the user; however, no violations were recorded when rules had instead been delivered through an organizational document or policy tool:

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	Cases: violation@3				Runs: rule state		
		Compacted			Compacted		
	Full context	Agent's own	Only after	Total	Ret.	Part.	Abs.
S2: delivery channel							
c1	**25.0**	**25.0**	31.3	**56.3**	**74.0**	24.0	2.1
c2	16.1	12.9	**32.3**	45.2	69.9	25.8	4.3
c3	0.0	0.0	30.6	30.6	65.7	**29.6**	**4.6**
c4	0.0	0.0	22.2	22.2	71.3	27.8	0.9
S3: compaction strategy family							
Generative	**12.0**	**10.0**	11.8	21.8	**91.2**	**7.8**	0.9
Selective	11.8	9.9	**40.4**	**50.2**	15.9	0.0	**84.1**
S4: compaction budget constraint (tokens)							
2,500	**15.6**	**12.5**	15.6	28.1	**100.0**	0.0	0.0
1,200	14.7	11.8	14.7	26.5	97.1	**2.9**	0.0
750	15.2	9.1	15.2	24.2	98.0	1.0	1.0
300	14.7	11.8	35.3	47.1	2.9	2.0	95.1
200	14.7	8.8	**41.2**	**50.0**	0.0	0.0	**100.0**

How rule delivery, compaction strategy and token budget affected violations and rule retention. Generative compaction preserved rules far more reliably than selective methods, while budgets of 300 tokens or less caused almost complete rule loss.

After compaction, violations rose across all four channels, reaching 56.3% for direct user instructions and 22.2% for policy-tool rules. Rule retention varied comparatively little, from 65.7% to 74%. The authors suggest that a later user request can be interpreted as overriding a personal rule, while an *organizational* rule cannot be overridden by the user.

How Do Compactor-Targeted Attacks and Defenses Affect Where Violations Come From?

Simply flooding the context with extra material had little effect, with violations actually falling from 37.8% to 34.3%. Compactor-targeted injection was considerably more effective, raising violations to 46.3% and reducing full rule retention from 70.1% to 42.5%.

The strongest attack, called *escape*, increased violations from 23.5% to 58.8% and reduced rule retention from 96.1% to 66.7%. Even when the rule survived, violations doubled from 13.3% to 26.5%.

	Cases: violation@k				Runs: rule state		
		Compacted			Compacted		
	Full context	Agent's own	Only after	Total	Ret.	Part.	Abs.
S5: added content							
None	9.6	8.9	28.9	37.8	70.1	**26.9**	3.0
V	**9.7**	9.0	25.4	34.3	**71.9**	22.9	5.2
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+ rule pres.	11.8	11.8	17.6	29.4	**99.0**	1.0	0.0

Test results showing the effects of attacks and defenses on rule compliance after compaction. Targeted injection increased violations and reduced rule retention, while the strongest defense restored retention to 99% without fully restoring compliance.

The strongest defense preserved the rule in 99% of runs – yet agents still broke it in 29.4% of cases, compared with 23.5% when no attack was used. In other words, making sure an agent still had the rule did *not* ensure that it would follow it.

Conclusion

Logic suggests that there is some kind of 'photocopier effect' at work when context is compacted dozens, hundreds of times in a very long thread (such as one that I have been working on in Codex* since mid-October, and was working on only this morning – an epic of experimental, AI-aided software development).

Like core system prompts, we don't get to see these compacted synopses of the action to date. My own anecdotal evidence suggests that the central mission survives the compression, along with most of the essential details. But then, I'm not in that nightmare scenario where the command 'Send this email to everyone', intended just for *everyone in the company*, ends up going to everyone in the aggregated corporate contacts book. Yowch.

* *I guess I'm getting old, but this is surely the most unmemorable, bland, 'corporate-beige' name that could have possibly been chosen for this agent. I am constantly forgetting it.*

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